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TORTS-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS-FOREIGN OBJECTS-THE ADOPTION OF THE
DISCOVERY RULE-LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE?
Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198,
290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
0 N JANUARY 29, 1958, the plaintiff underwent abdominal surgery at
the defendant-hospital, the surgeon being a salaried employee of the
hospital. The plaintiff was last seen by the defendant as an outpatient on
May 7, 1958. On February 7, 1969, more than ten years after the
operation and nearly ten years since their hospital-patient relationship
had terminated, the plaintiff filed suit against the hospital alleging its
employee-surgeon had negligently left a metallic forceps and a non-
absorbent sponge inside his abdomen, and that he had been required to
undergo additional surgery on October 9, 1968, for removal of the foreign
objects. The plaintiff further alleged that he did not discover the presence
of these objects until February 13, 1968.1 The defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment and the trial court granted said motion on the
basis that the plaintiff had failed to file his action within the time
permitted by the applicable statute of limitation.2 The judgment was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed
and remanded holding,
Where a metallic forceps and a nonabsorbent sponge are negligently
left inside a patient's body during surgery, the running of the statute
of limitation governing a claim therefor is tolled until the patient
discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the negligent act.
3
The rationale of the Court was that Melnyk could be distinguished with
the recent case of Wyler v. Tripi,4 which held that a cause of action for
medical malpractice accrues at the latest when the physician-patient
relationship terminates, and which also recognized the legislature's
authority to act in this area, on the basis that Wyler was not a foreign
object case. Therefore, the Court felt it need not disturb the Wyler holding
and could nevertheless hold the failure to remove the foreign objects
1 Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
2 Omo Rnv. CODE § 2305.11 (Page 1953) [hereinafter cited as The Ohio Statute],
which reads in part, "An action for ... malpractice ... shall be brought within one
year after the cause thereof accrued ......
3 Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
4 Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Wyler].
[265]
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in Melnyk was negligence as a matter of law and that equity and public
policy require an exception to the general rule.
The central issue in Melnyk is at what point in time such a cause
of action accrues. Stated more precisely, did the cause of action accrue,
and thus the statute commence to run, at the time of the negligent act
(i.e., the negligent failure to remove the foreign objects) or did the cause
of action accrue at the time the patient discovered the negligent act?
The determination of this issue invariably involves the interpretation of
the phrase "after the cause of action thereof accrued."' 5 The wording
of the Ohio statute is similar to statutes of limitations in other jurisdictions
in that it is phrased in general terms which require the commencement of
the limitation's period merely "when the cause of action accrues." 6 The
courts have been unable to define that phrase with any consistency.7
It is generally stated that a cause of action accrues when the
wrongful act complained of is committed and not on the date which
the damage is discovered.8 Jurisdictions have interpreted the word
"accrued" to mean the time of commission of the negligent act, not the
time of discovery.9 This interpretation is referred to as the general or
traditional view and remains the majority rule, although the trend is
quickly sweeping away from it.10 The rationale behind this view is that
it is the act rather than the ensuing damage which constitutes the basis
for a cause of action." If there is noticeable injury when the original act
5 OHIo REv. CODE, § 2305.11 (Page 1953).
6 Sixteen states have specific statutes pertaining to malpractice actions (Ala., Ark.,
Colo., Ind., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Mo., Neb., N.H., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, S.D.).
However, in most instances the statutes of limitation relating to medical malpractice
actions contain the exact same wording as the statutes governing negligence actions;
see 55 IOWA L. REv. 486, 487 (1969). See also Note, 3 SUF. L. REv. 597 (1969) for
a general survey of the statutes.
7 30 Osno ST. L.J. 425, 426-27 (1969). Only seven statutes specify when that accrual
point is reached; see 28 MD. L. REV. 47, at 55 n. 7 (1968).
8Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228,
182 A.2d 660 (1962); See Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New
York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1962); 45 ORE. L. REV. 73
(1965); 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 78, 79 (1968); 18 WEST. REs. L. REV. 1002 (1967).
9 45 ORE. L. REV., supra note 7.
10Lillich, supra note 7; see 8 IDAHO L. REV. 371, 372 (1972); see 25 WAsH. & LEE
L. REv., supra note 7, at n. 20. One exception to this trend is Hawks v. DeHart, 206
Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d, 187 (1966).
11 This rule was well stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:
Any act of misconduct or negligence... in the service undertaken... gave rise
to a right of action in contract or tort, and the statutory period began to run at
that time, and not when the actual damage results or is ascertained .... The
damage sustained by the wrong done is not the cause of action....
Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654-55 (1919).
[Vol. 6:2
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of negligence occurs, this rule usually leads to equitable results.
2
However, strict application of this doctrine presents difficulties when the
statutory period expires before the plaintiff discovers he has been injured
at all.-3 Application of this rule to medical malpractice actions has led
to harsh results,14 and the courts began making exceptions to the general
rule to avoid unjust decisions.15
At one time, courts allowed an injured plaintiff to sue in contract'
6
so that he could take advantage of the longer statute of limitations.
However, today the contract basis has fallen into virtual disuse,
7 and it
is generally conceded that the action lies in tort.
Another device adopted by the courts to allow relief from the harsh
result of strict construction is the fraudulent concealment theory.
8 This
theory is based upon the physician or surgeon's knowledge of an error
committed while treating a patient and his attempt to conceal the error.
Under this exception, the statute is tolled until the patient discovers, or
with due diligence should have discovered, his injury.19 This theory has
12 See Krantz & Schwartz, Statutes of Limitation in Cases of Insidious Diseases, 12
CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 225, 227 (1963).
13 See Anderson, The Application of Statutes of Limitations to Actions Against
Physicians and Surgeons, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 237 (1958); Lillich, supra note 7; Note,
Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528 (1957).
'432 IND. LJ., supra note 12, at 528-29, 45 ORE. L. REv., supra note 7; 12 Wyo.
LJ. 30, at 31, n. 9 (1957); Hudson v. Moore (sponge not discovered for 14 years),
239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940); Giambozi v. Peters (plaintiff contracted syphilis
through doctor's failure to test blood used in a transfusion, although partial recovery
was permitted on a contract theory), 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Lewis
v. Shaver (unauthorized removal of an ovary and the tying of plaintiff's Fallopian
tubes not discovered for 7 years), 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
15 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (1964). The court
said,
Indeed, it appears that most jurisdictions, when faced with the set of facts we
have presented herein [surgical sponge] would, on one theory or another, allow
appellants to come into court and present their claims. To apply the label of
"general rule" to respondent's position and "minority rule" to the discovery
doctrine is not only misleading but erroneous. If, however, it is necessary to
apply labels, it appears that the so-called "general rule" as stated in A.L.R. is
in fact the minority rule.
See also, 32 IND. LJ., supra note 12, 528, 529.
16 Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923); Kennedy v. Parrot, 243 N.C.
355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
1 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 491, 389 P.2d 224, 228 (1964). The
majority view as reflected by Huysman v. Kirchs, 6 Cal.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936)
states injuries as a result of medical malpractice lie in tort.
18 See Lillich, supra note 7 for a more detailed explanation of this exception; see also
32 IND. L.J., supra note 12, at 535-40.
19 Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953); Saffold
v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind.
101, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1952); Lakeman
v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959). The determination of when the
party discovers or should have discovered the injury is usually a jury question. See,
e.g., Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967).
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been extended to constructive fraudulent concealment where liability isbased upon the doctor's failure to inform his patient where the physician
knew or should have known of such injury. Thus the element of actual
knowledge has been eliminated.20
A more widely used theory is the continuing treatment theory (also
referred to as the end of treatment theory or the termination rule). This
theory has been used in situations where a doctor leaves a foreign object
in the body of the patient and continues to treat him after the operation.
The physician is said to be negligent not only in his initial action but alsoin allowing the object to remain in the patient's body, while the patient is
still under his care. According to this analysis, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the patient leaves the care of the physician.2'
The reasoning is that the patient is not usually aware of the error of the
physician, upon whom he continues to rely for treatment. This doctrine
was first adopted in the Ohio case of Gillette v. Tucker,22 wherein the
failure to discover and remove a sponge left in the patient's body was held
to be "continuing negligence" on the part of the physician. Liability was
grounded on a breach of an implied contract by the physician to exercise
reasonable care. The breach was not deemed to have occurred until the
relationship ended, and it was at that point, the statute began to run. 23
The Ohio approach-the statute runs on the termination of the
relationship 
-- [hereinafter referred to as the termination rule], as
suggested in Bowers v. Santee25 is said to strengthen the physician-patient
relationship in three ways. It is said the patient should have the right to
20 Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo.
363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
21 Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App.2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942); DeHaan v. Winter, 253
Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958); DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d177 (1952). See Sacks, Statutes of Limitations in Undiscovered Malpractice, 16
CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 65, 67-68 (1967).
2267 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). The Gillette case was overruled by McArthur
v. Bowers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N.E. 1128 (1905) (per curiam, relying on dissent inGillette), but was subsequently reaffirmed by Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124
N.E. 238 (1919).23 This continuing negligence or treatment theory allows for two closely related
interpretations: 1) that the statute of limitation commences to run from the end ofthe treatment as in Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966), or2) from the termination of the physician-patient relationship as in Ohio. Some courtshave held that the statute does not begin to run until the end of the treatment only ifthe subsequent treatment is "continuingly negligent" (i.e., the continuing negligence
theory); see Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).2 4 The "termination rule" in the context used here, necessarily is inclusive of any
modification of the continuing negligence or treatment theories.
25 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
AKRON LAw Rsvi~w [Vol. 6:2
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rely on the doctor's ability until their relationship has ended; that the
physician is thus protected from premature litigation, and that he has
the opportunity to give full treatment, and even correct his errors.
On the other hand, the termination rule (and its modifications) has
been subject to wide criticism.26 Where there is no apparent injury
contemporaneous with the negligent act, the application of a rule which
uses as its basis the termination of treatment or the termination of the
physician-patient relationship will not aid the patient or change the harsh
result intended to be relieved. This basis merely extends the period of
time before the statute of limitations commences to run by a factor which
bears no logical relationship to any injury later discovered by a patient.
Thus, in cases where the injury is one which requires a long developmental
period before becoming dangerous and discoverable, the injured party
would still be precluded from recovery, as a result of the statute running
before he is even aware of the injury's existence.
27
Since judicial application of exceptions has not alleviated the
harshness of the traditional approach, the courts have begun to reevaluate
when a cause of action accrues. The growing trend among the jurisdic-
tions is the adoption of the discovery rule,
28 whereby the statute of
limitations does not commence to run until the patient discovers or with
due diligence should have discovered his injury.? Nineteen states today
follow the general rule or a modification of it (i.e., termination rule);so
26 See Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So.2d 651 (1955), wherein the
court barred the plaintiffs claim although she had suffered for over six years, having
been unaware of the source of her pain. One case has specifically rejected the "end of
treatment" doctrine: Tessier v. U.S., 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959). See also 31
FoRDHAm L. REv. 842 (1963); 32 IND. L.J., supra note 12, 528.
2 30 OHIo ST. L.J., supra note 6, 429-430.
28 See 3 Su-p. L. REv., supra note 5, 614-615 for an excellent view of the growing
trend as of 1969.
29The doctrine was first asserted in Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83
(1917). For an excellent discussion of the discovery doctrine, see Note, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 657 (1962). See also 55 IOWA L. REv., supra note 5 at 488.
30 Acton v. Morrison, 62 Ariz. 139, 155 P.2d 782 (1945); Crossett Health Center v.
Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App.
628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Il. App.2d 336,
199 N.E.2d 633 (1964); Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956); Ogg
v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917); Waddell v. Woods, 160 Kan. 481, 163
P.2d 348 (1945); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962); Pasquale
v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Wilder v. St. Joseph Hospital,
225 Miss. 42, 82 So.2d 651 (1955); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d
760 (1943) (see, also, MIssoupi STATUTES, § 516.40 [actions for malpractice must
be brought within two years from the date of the act]); Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105
N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508
(1957); DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Hinkle v.
Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957); Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2
S.W.2d 104 (1928) (See also, Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140
[1934]); Murray v. Allen, 108 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931); Hawks v. DeHart, 206
Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966); Lotten v. O'Brien, 146 Wis. 258, 131 N.W. 361
(1911).
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eight jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule but have specifically
limited it to cases where a foreign object (i.e., surgical sponge, gauze,
forceps, etc.) have been negligently left in the patient's body,3l and
fourteen states have adopted the discovery rule for all malpractice
cases, regardless of whether a foreign object is involved.32 Two states
have adopted the discovery rule by statute.3
The determination to adopt the discovery rule or remain with
the traditional rule reveals a conflict between two basic policies of
law: 1) The policy of discouraging the fostering of stale claims, and
2) The policy of allowing meritorious claimants an opportunity to
present their claims.34
Those jurisdictions rejecting the discovery rule may feel that the
statute of limitations was established to protect individuals from long and
bothersome waiting periods, which 1) yield difficulty in obtaining
evidence and defending due to the length of time, and 2) encourage stale
claims.35 This argument is answered by pointing out that the discovery
rule when applied to foreign object cases is serving an equitable and just
purpose since there is no issue of a stale claim present. Furthermore,
statutes of limitations theoretically work against those who willingly
31Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) (Compare, Rosane v.Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 [1944]); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del.1968); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully,35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) (See also, Rothman v. Silber, 90 N.J. Super. 22,216 A.2d 18 [19661); Flanagan v. Mt. Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248N.E.2d 871 (1969); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1961); Gaddis v. Smith, 417S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968);Morgan v. Grace Hospital, 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).32Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Ca.2d 767, 270P.2d 1 (1954); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 433 P.2d 220 (Haw. 1967); Renner v.Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166(Ky. 1970); Springer v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 169 So.2d 171 (La. App. 1964)(see Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 [1963]; Perrin v. Rodriguez,153 So. 555 [La. App. 19341); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825(1966) (see Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 [1917]); Johnson v.Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1962); Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967), citing Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 148 Mont.125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Berry
v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966), overruling Vaughn v. Langmack, 236Ore. 542, 390 P.2d 142 (1964); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959);Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 745 (R.I. 1968); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660,453 P.2d 631 (1969); United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958); BrushBeryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960).33 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-58 4 (1958).
34 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 489, 389 P.2d 224, 226 (1964).35 Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 316 (9th Cir. 1967); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me.228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962). The court, in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp.,12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963) said, "[Slociety isbest served by a complete repose after a certain number of years even at the sacrifice
of a few unfortunate cases."
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"sleep on their rights," but one who is unaware of any right cannot
be said to have done so.
3s
A more difficult and persuasive argument against the adoption of
the discovery rule is that statutes of limitations are creatures of the
legislature and the clear intent of the legislature should not be cast aside
by judicial fiat simply because "it may be considered harsh in its
application to malpractice cases." 7 Consequently, it is argued that the
adoption of the discovery rule in effect amends the statute of limitations,
a function purely legislative in character. 38 Support for this view is found
in states where the legislatures have amended the statute of limitations
to include the discovery rule for fraudulent concealment 'but not to
malpractice in general, 39 and where there have been unsuccessful attempts
by legislative members to do away with the old rule.40
Ohio has consistently placed itself with the jurisdictions opposing
adoption of the discovery rule, favoring the termination rule.4 ' The
court's decision to employ the discovery rule rationale is contrary to
Ohio's long established position of opposing the adoption of the discovery
rule, and which was recently reexamined and reaffirmed by this very
court in Wyler v. Tripi,42 which held, "A cause of action for medical
malpractice accrues at the latest, when the physician-patient relationship
finally terminates."
In Wyler, the court referred to the termination rule as a marked
departure from the general rule, but conceded nevertheless that in cases
where the injury is one which required a long developmental period
before becoming dangerous and discoverable, the termination rule affords
36 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964). See also
59 Ky. L.J. 990 at 995, where the writer stated, "to deny recovery to the plaintiff
when he could not possibly discover the negligent act until after the statute had run
would be a far greater injustice than the resulting disadvantage to the defendant."
37 Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485 at 506, 389 P.2d 224 at 238
(1964).
38 Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964); Philpot v. Stacy, 371 S.W.2d 11
(Ky. 1963).
39ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83 § 23 (Smith-Hurd 1965); See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-7
(1953), WIsC. STAT. ANN. § 102.12 (1957).
4Opasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966), where the court
cited the legislative history of the statute of limitation and the unsuccessful attempts
to modify it which indicated, the court said, "reaffirmation and strengthening of
what has been legislative policy ... "
41 Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
42 Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971) in which the plaintiff
claimed a negligent diagnosis of x-rays by the doctor resulting in the replacement of
her right hip and the subsequent removal of her right leg. Held: Barred by the statute
of limitation under the termination of the physician-patient relationship.
43 Id. at 164. 267 N.E.2d 419.
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little relief.44 After examining the different jurisdictions on this point and
viewing the growing trend away from the general rule and towards the
adoption of the discovery rule, the Wyler court stated,
Although an examination of the cases reveals that there is much to
recommend the adoption of the discovery rule, we reluctantly
conclude the courts of Ohio should not decree such an adoption. We
are convinced that to do so would place us in the obvious and
untenable position of having not only legislated, but of having done
so directly in the face of a clear and opposite legislative intent.45
The Wyler court then emphasized legislative opposition to the
discovery rule by citing several bills that had been before the legislature,
including one specifically adopting the discovery rule, but had not been
passed. Moreover, the court pointed out the legislature had nevertheless
created certain exceptions to the general termination rule and tolled the
statute. Furthermore, the court pointed to three states which had adopted
the discovery rule by legislative enactment and noted this as an affirmation
of their belief that adoption of the discovery rule was a legislative
prerogative. The court concluded its rejection of the discovery doctrine
by stating, "[We] refrain from judicially adopting that which has so
clearly been legislatively rejected." 46
Notwithstanding this very analytical and recent pronouncement of
the court's position, this same court in the instant case employed the
discovery rule rationale, holding the statute of limitation would be tolled
until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the negligent act.47 However, the court limited
the holding to the particular facts of Melnyk, distinguished the case with
Wyler, and refused to adopt the discovery rule, either in general, or even
specifically, in foreign object cases. Apparently, in view of the Wyler
rationale, the court was only prepared to go as far as it felt it had to go
in order to insure an equitable result.
The Melnyk court has completely abandoned the rationale which
served as the basis and justification for the Wyler decision, namely, that
of legislative prerogative in this area. However, in so doing, the court did
not adopt the natural conclusion such an abandonment inevitably
implies-the adoption of the discovery rule-at least limited to foreign
object cases. While the Ohio Supreme Court took great pains to
distinguish Melnyk and Wyler, based upon the absence of foreign objects
44 Id. at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
45 Id. at 170-171, 267 N.E.2d at 423. The court referred to Pasquale v. Chandler, supra
note 40, for support.
46 Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 164, 171-1i2, 267 N.E.2d 419, 424.
47 Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972).
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in the latter, and therefore the problems of the defense of stale claims
does not exist 49 (such is not an issue in a foreign object case for
the objects themselves are evidence of a true and realistic claim) the
distinction in essence is an artificial one. This is evident because
the Court's sole basis for its decision in Wyler was the recognition of the
legislative prerogative in this area-a basis equally applicable in Melnyk.
The Wyler Court's holding against adopting the discovery rule rests
completely on the legislative prerogative rationale, and no mention was
made at all of the policy of discouraging stale claims with their ensuing
burden on the defendant in gathering evidence.
It is clear from a thorough analysis of Wyler and Melnyk that the
Ohio Supreme Court has sidestepped its own judicial function in fear of
encroaching upon her sister branch. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated
in DeLong v. Campbell,49 with regard to the issue of the statute of
limitation, that the court's "sole function is to interpret and enforce
legislative enactment." The Ohio statute in issue is phrased in general
terminology and requires only that the statute of limitation commences
running "after the cause of action thereof accrued." 50 The statute set the
limit within which to sue but left undetermined the question of when
the cause of action actually accrues. What the Ohio Supreme Court has
refused to recognize is that it, the Court, has already determined in
Gillette v. Tucker,51 when a cause of action accrues. Ohio's adoption
of the termination rule has always been the product of judicial
interpretation, not legislative promulgation. The Judiciary has always been
the branch of government to determine at what point in time a cause of
action actually accrues and when a statute commences to run. The
instant case reaffirms this fact.
Strong support for the judicial role in the interpretation of statutory
language involving statutes of limitation is found in other jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, when recently confronted with this issue
(it is to be noted the legislative history is very similar to the Ohio
legislative history explored in Wyler) stated:
It is contended that the failure of the legislature to pass bills...
which would have ameliorated the harshness of the [general] rule
shows the legislature is cognizant of the problem and desires no
change. The fallacy in this argument is that no one knows why the
legislature did not pass the proposed measures .... Legislative inaction
is weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent.
5 2
48 Id. at 200, 290 N.E.2d at 917.
49 DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
50 OHIO Rv. CODE § 2305.11 (Page 1953).
51 Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
52 Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Ore. 1966).
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The Court further stated:
The contention is made that a decision of this kind amounts tojudicial legislation. The legislature, however, did not provide that
the time of accrual was when the physician performed the negligent
act. This Court did. The legislature left the matter undetermined. A
determination that the time of accrual is the time of discovery is
no more judicial legislation than it is the time of the commission
of the act.5
In Fernandi v. Strully,54 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in adopting
the discovery rule, stated:
The rather obscure nature of the legislative phraseology is amply
attested by the frequency of the cases in which courts have been
required to pass on when the cause of action may properly be said
to have accrued.... [T]he question when a cause of action accrues is
a judicial one, and to determine it in any particular case is to
establish a general rule of law for a class of cases, which rule must
be founded on reason and justice.5
In a factual situation virtually the same as the instant case, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held in adopting the discovery
rule that: "We are merely called upon to construe the statute as it was
enacted by the legislature and that function is one peculiarly for the
judicial branch of government. ' ' 56
Considering the above support from other jurisdictions, and a proper
analysis of the role of the judiciary in formulating the "termination rule"
in Ohio in the past, there is no reason why one judicial pronouncement
(the termination rule) should be given any more weight than another."
This is especially true in light of the fact that the reasons behind that
decision are no longer valid. 58 The discovery rule should be adopted in
Ohio, if not completely, then definitely in all foreign object cases.
ALAN J. SOBOL
53 Id. at 999. The court also answered the argument concerning the legislature's
expressed adoption of discovery for fraud and deceit and not for malpractice in
general. See 421 P.2d 996, 997-999.
54 Fernand v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
55 Id. at 449, 173 A.2d at 285.
56 Morgan v. Grace Hospital, 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
57 30 OHio ST. L.J., supra note 6, at 432.
58 The contractual basis upon which the physician-patient relationship approach rests
was all but ignored by the Ohio Supreme Court in the DeLong case. It was completely
done away with in the case of Swankowacha v. Dicthelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129
N.E.2d 182 (1953).
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